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Abstract
Global warming, with its harmful effects, is one of  the most crucial issues 
of  the 21st century. States of  the international community have responded 
to this challenge by resorting to an original instrument: tradable emissions 
permits for carbon and, as a direct consequence, the pollution rights mar-
kets. This article deals with the study of  this hybrid instrument and is divided 
into three parts. The first part concerns the description and an assessment 
of  the initial framework enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol (I). The second 
part provides an overview of  the reactions triggered by the consecration of  
the approach put forward in the Protocol (II). On the basis of  the various 
adopted measures, an outline of  the alternative and feasible solutions will 
be drawn in the last section. In this regard, we will recommend an appro-
ach that would start from the carbon markets as they exist today but which 
would integrate them and coordinate the available social and institutional 
actors (civil society, NGOs, federated and local entities, etc.) through a me-
chanism of  fungibility that would make the markets compatible with each 
other. From an operational point of  view, this fungibility could occur by 
using new technologies such as blockchain (III).
Keywords: Global Warming, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement, Carbon 
Markets, EU-ETS, blockchain, civil society.
Resumo
O aquecimento global, com seus efeitos nocivos, é uma das questões mais 
cruciais do século XXI. Os Estados da comunidade internacional respon-
deram a esse desafio recorrendo a um instrumento original: licenças de 
emissões negociáveis  de carbono e, como consequência direta, os mercados 
de direitos de poluição. Este artigo trata do estudo deste instrumento híbri-
do e está dividido em três partes. A primeira parte diz respeito à descrição e 
avaliação do quadro inicial consagrado no Protocolo de Kyoto (I). A segunda 
parte fornece uma visão geral das reações desencadeadas pela consagração 
da abordagem proposta no Protocolo (II). Com base nas várias medidas 
adotadas, será delineado um esboço das soluções alternativas e viáveis  na úl-
tima seção. Nesse sentido, recomendaremos uma abordagem que começaria 
a partir dos mercados de carbono como eles existem hoje, mas que os inte-
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graria e coordenaria os atores sociais e institucionais di-
sponíveis (sociedade civil, ONGs, entidades federadas e 
locais, etc.) por meio de um mecanismo de fungibilidade 
que tornaria os mercados compatíveis entre si. Do pon-
to de vista operacional, essa fungibilidade pode ocorrer 
usando novas tecnologias, como blockchain (III).
Palavras-chave: Aquecimento Global, Protocolo de 
Kyoto, Acordo de Paris, Mercados de Carbono, EU-
ETS, blockchain, sociedade civil.
1 Introduction
According to the United Nations (“the UN”), global 
warming has numerous dramatic environmental, social, 
and economic consequences. Among these, the main 
concerns are undoubtedly those associated with the rise 
in sea levels that will lead to multiple floods and the dis-
placement of  populations. This increase in temperature 
will also accelerate the hydrological cycle and reduce the 
quantity and quality of  freshwater supplies. Finally, this 
progression will particularly affect the living conditions 
of  the poorest amongst the Earth’s population to the 
extent that they will be the ones most exposed to the 
impacts of  climate change, as they have fewer resour-
ces to allocate to the prevention and mitigation of  its 
effects1.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (“the IPCC”)2, human activities represent 
the main cause of  global warming, and are particularly 
responsible for greenhouse gas emissions (“GHG”), in-
cluding carbon; they are said to have caused the rise of  
temperatures to 1°C above pre-industrial levels. Therefo-
re, the fight against global warming is demonstrably one 
of  the most crucial global challenges of  the 21st century 
in that the harmful consequences of  global warming are 
innumerable and the solution to mitigate its effects re-
quires a change in our production methods and lifestyles.
To date, to meet this unprecedented challenge, Sta-
tes of  the international community and the European 
1 For more details, see http://www.un.org/fr/climatechange/
consequences.shtml 
2 The IPCC is an intergovernmental body, open to all member 
countries of  the United Nations, established in 1988 in order to 
provide detailed assessments of  the state of  scientific, technical and 
socio-economic knowledge of  climate change, its causes, its poten-
tial impacts, and respomse strategies - https://www.ipcc.ch 
Union, as well as some sub-state actors, have chosen to 
resort to a newly devised regulatory instrument: trada-
ble emissions permits for carbon and, as a direct con-
sequence, the pollution rights markets. In other words, 
our political decision-makers have deemed this hybrid 
rights-market instrument, a true unidentified legal ob-
ject (ULO)3, as the best method for attempting to ta-
ckle one of  the great challenges of  our time on which 
depends the survival of  humanity and our planet. The 
study of  this little-known mechanism (even though it is 
more than twenty years old) is the core of  this article. 
Although original at first glance, the system of  
pollution rights markets is not new. It was developed by 
the Canadian economist John Dales4, echoing the idea 
of  Thomas Crocker (1966), who believed that “unless 
gross error on [his] part, markets can be used to imple-
ment any anti-pollution policy [one can] dream of ”5. 
The Kyoto Protocol, and later the Paris Agreement—in 
addition to European Union law—have legally recogni-
zed this economic theory.
On the legal front, today we find ourselves in a pi-
votal period for the international fight against global 
warming: the Kyoto Protocol set targets for the initial 
period of  2008-2012, which was then extended until 
2020, while the Paris Agreement, which entered into 
force in 2016, will have to take over for the post-2020 
period. The Kyoto Protocol’s track record is unsatis-
factory. The figures speak for themselves: according 
to the available data, GHG emissions covered by the 
Kyoto Protocol have increased by 30%6 to 50%7 since 
1990. 2018 is said to have been a record year in terms 
of  emitted CO2 levels8. However, the protocol has had 
the merit of  jump-starting a global process of  carbon 
pricing and providing a legal framework within which to 
develop carbon markets. Since this instrument consists 
3 For an analysis of  the legal nature of  quotas, see CHENEV-
IERE (C.), Le système d’échange de quotas d’émission de gaz à effet de serre. 
Protéger le climat, préserver le marché intérieur, Brussels, Bruylant, 2018, 
p. 193 to 243.
4 DALES (J. H.), Pollution, Property & Prices, Université de Toronto, 
1968.
5 Ibid., p. 100.
6 VIRLOUVET (G.), Vingt ans de lutte contre le réchauffement climatique 
en France : bilan et perspectives des politiques publiques, http://www.eesc.
europa.eu/ceslink/resources/docs/2015_12_lutte_rechauffement_
climatique1.pdf, April 2015, p. 13.
7 International Energy Agency.
8 http://www.lefigaro.fr/sciences/2018/12/05/01008-
20181205ARTFIG00331-nette-reprise-des-emissions-de-co2-
en-2018.php
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of  time-bound commitments, subsequent COPs were 
organized to play a significant role in renewing them. 
Still, these conferences have led to no substantial im-
provement in the carbon market; it was not until COP 
21 in Paris (eighteen years later) that a new agreement 
was reached, whose ambition and concrete contribution 
to the fight against climate change extended the Kyoto 
system without actually bringing real innovation in this 
area.
In order to understand the current situation of  the 
carbon markets and to find solutions for the future, 
this article will be divided into three parts. The first 
part concerns the description and an assessment of  the 
initial framework enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol (I). 
The second part provides an overview of  the reactions 
triggered by the consecration of  the approach put for-
ward in the protocol (II)9. On the basis of  the various 
adopted measures, an outline of  the alternative and 
feasible solutions will be drawn in the last section. In 
this regard, we will recommend an approach that would 
start from the carbon markets as they exist today but 
which would integrate them and coordinate the availa-
ble social and institutional actors (civil society, NGOs, 
federated and local entities, etc.) through a mechanism 
of  fungibility that would make the markets compatible 
with each other. From an operational point of  view, this 
fungibility could occur by using new technologies such 
as blockchain (III).
2 The Kyoto Protocol
When the international community decided to tackle 
global warming as a whole, negotiations first focused 
on the reality of  global warming, its intensity, causes, 
consequences, and extent. These matters, which are at 
the heart of  the IPCC’s work, are extensively discussed 
in the literature10 and will be only indirectly addressed in 
9 These first two parts (I and II) update and complete certain sec-
tions of  the article VAN WAEYENBERGE (A.) « Lutter contre 
le réchauffement climatique : le cas des marchés carbone », in C. 
Bricteux et B. Frydman (dir.), Les grands défis du droit global, Brussels, 
Bruylant, 2017, p. 115 to 147.
10 For detailed studies on these topics, see, inter alia, the work of  
the IPCC (http://www.ipcc.ch/home_languages_main_french.
shtml ) but also ENCINA DE MUNAGORRI (R.) (dir.), Expertise 
et gouvernance du changement climatique, Paris, LGDJ, 2009 ; MASLIN 
(M.), Climate Change: a very short introduction, Oxford, OUP, 2014, 5th 
edition.
this article, which takes a look at the fight against global 
warming through the prism of  the regulatory mechanis-
ms proposed to remedy it.
It was not until the international community became 
aware of  the gravity of  the situation in the early 1990s, 
when the Earth Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro 
(1992), for a new dynamic to take hold. From amongst 
the adopted texts, two deserve special attention in the 
context of  the fight against global warming. Firstly, the 
Rio Declaration, which advanced the concept of  Sta-
tes’ rights and responsibilities in the areas of   environ-
ment and development by establishing the principle of  
“common but differentiated responsibilities”11 (Princi-
ple 7). Secondly, the Framework Convention signed in 
Rio, which layed the foundation for international coo-
peration in the face of  climate change and established 
an institutional framework with a very specific type of  
governance: the Conferences of  the Parties (“COP”). 
However, the only accepted coordination measure was 
the setting of  quantified targets which did not make it a 
clear obligation for industrialized countries to stabilize, 
and even more so reduce, their GHG emissions, but 
merely established a legal and institutional framework 
for the gradual development of  a more operational in-
ternational system.12
2.1  An agreement on quantified targets but 
with flexibility to meet them
On the basis of  the achievements of  the Framework 
Convention13 and inspired by the principle of  “com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities”, the Internatio-
nal Conference held in Kyoto in 1997 put forward the 
specific objectives to be attained: industrialized coun-
tries (the United States, Canada, Japan, Member States 
11 The principle of  “common but differentiated responsibilities” 
can be defined “as a legal technique that consists of  modulating the conven-
tional obligations of  States according to the level and needs of  their development” 
and is justified “by their unequal contribution to the degradation of  the envi-
ronment on the one hand, and the acknowledgement that their respective economic 
situation must be taken into account on the other”, see BADABI (G.), Le 
principe de responsabilités communes mais différenciées dans les conventions de 
droit international de l’environnement, 2016, https://www.village-justice.
com/articles/principe-des-responsabilites-communes-mais-differ-
enciees-dans-les-Conventions,23303.html  
12 PALLEMAERTS (M.), La Communauté européenne comme partie 
contractante au Protocole de Kyoto, Am-Env., 2003, special number, p. 
16 ; OUHARON (A.), Les négociations sur le climat : un bref  retour sur 
l’histoire, Flux 2002/2-3, N° 48-49, p. 100.
13 This Convention is currently comprised of  197 Parties (includ-
ing the European Union).
PI
G
E
O
LE
T,
 L
ou
ise
; W
A
E
Y
E
N
BE
RG
E
, A
rn
au
d 
Va
n.
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t a
nd
 c
ha
lle
ng
es
 o
f 
ca
rb
on
 m
ar
ke
ts.
 R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
16
, n
. 2
, p
. 7
3-
88
, 2
01
9
77
of  the European Union and countries of  the former 
Eastern Bloc –  referred to as “Annex I Parties” ) com-
mitted themselves to reducing their GHG emissions 
by an average of  5.2% compared with 1990 reference 
levels14. Reaching this agreement, which was originally 
scheduled to end in 2012, but was extended until 2020, 
was only made possible through the establishment of  
three flexibility mechanisms15. Concurrently with the in-
ternal policy measures to reduce GHG emissions, these 
allow States subject to the obligations of  the protocol 
to execute in another State the requirements imposed 
on it.
Firstly, the Emission Trading Scheme (Article 17 of  the 
Kyoto Protocol), where each committed State is alloca-
ted, according to its emission reduction target, a certain 
amount of  international emission allowances. Countries 
that do not use all their rights will be able to sell them. 
In this way, some countries will be able to buy the allo-
wances they lack from other countries that have less di-
fficulty meeting their emission reduction targets. This 
exchange mechanism is in the hands of  the States and 
leads to the creation of  a carbon market and the setting 
of  a carbon price.
Secondly, the Joint Implementation Mechanism (Article 6 
of  the Kyoto Protocol) allows an industrialized country 
that has ratified the Kyoto Protocol to acquire emission 
credits from another State by financing reduction of  
GHG emissions projects not on its national territory, 
but on the territory of  other industrialized countries 
which are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol where re-
duction costs are lower.
Thirdly, the Clean Development Mechanism (Article 12 
of  the Kyoto Protocol) is a mechanism regulated and 
overseen by the United Nations that is greatly different 
from the Joint Implementation Mechanism. First of  all, 
the investments are made by countries that have ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol on the territory of  developing coun-
tries that are not subject to any mandatory reduction of  
GHG emissions. Furthermore, these investments create 
14 8% for the European Union, 7% for the United States, and 6% 
for Japan.
15 HAUSER (J.) and MIGEOT (C.), Les fonds d’investissement carbone 
ou de la commercialisation du droit de l’environnement, ACE, November 
2006, p. 22. For a detailed study, see DELAISSE (P.), SEPULCHRE 
(P.), WINZEN (R.), FREESTONE (D.) and STRECK (D.), Legal 
aspects of  implementing the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms: making Kyoto work, 
New York, OUP, 2005 ; DENIS (B.), La procédure de validation du ‘mé-
canisme pour un développement propre’ comme instrument de la gouvernance du 
climat, Encina de Munagorri (R.) (dir.), op. cit.; from p. 131.
new rights that can be added to the emission allowances 
of  the “financing” country and thus increase its emis-
sion rights. The operation of  allocation of  emission ri-
ghts “is not a zero-sum game because in this case there 
is no exchange between the countries concerned, but 
only the creation of  new emission credits the ‘financing’ 
country benefits from without a subtraction of  credits 
from the financed country”16. In other words, this me-
chanism thus generates a “net inflation”, that is to say, 
beyond the “cap” on the number of  emission credits. 
The 2016 Paris Agreement provides a new one intended 
to replace it, but since the discussions on this subject 
held in Poland last winter were unsuccessful, the matter 
was postponed to the next COP in 201917 (see below).
The Kyoto Protocol thus creates a cap-and-trade 
system, by limiting the quantities of  authorized emis-
sions, with emissions allowance trading18. It should also 
be noted that with this market-oriented approach, it is 
mainly the American vision that is retained. This vision 
is strongly influenced by the business communities, 
which are not in favor of  taxes and rely on the pre-
vious experience (since the 1990s) of  the introduction 
of  sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitric oxide (NO) emission 
allowances by the US energy sector in order to redu-
ce acid rain. This situation is paradoxical as the United 
States has gone from being a leader in this field and a 
repository of  conclusive experience to being a country 
that refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol19.
2.2  A mixed record: an inefficient system and 
minimal political progress
In the words of  a specialist on the subject, Christian 
de Perthuis: “in hindsight, it is clear that the [Kyoto] 
protocol has not delivered the expected results. [...] The 
emission trading scheme did not work [...].”20
Commentators agree on the two main causes of  
16 HAUSER (J.) and MIGEOT (C.), op. cit., p. 22.
17 https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop24-key-outcomes-agreed-at-
the-un-climate-talks-in-katowice (consulted on March 16, 2019)
18 In this regard, see COUPRY (P. M.), Réduction des pluies acides 
aux USA: succès du marché, available on the website www.novethic.fr ;
19 The federal Waxman-Markey Bill (2009) opened new perspec-
tives and brought the United States closer to the Kyoto Protocol. 
Although it had received a majority of  favorable votes in the House 
of  Representatives, the Senate voted against it and the Protocol was 
never ratified.
20 DE PERTHUIS (C.) and TROTIGNON (R.), Le climat, à quel 
prix? La négociation climatique, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2015, p. 78.
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this less than thrilling record: the lack of  incentives for 
developing or non-Kyoto protocol countries to reduce 
their emissions and the lack of  a long-term project21. 
The lack of  incentives for non-Annex I countries is 
the result of  the application of  the principle of  com-
mon but differentiated responsibility, which leads to the 
exemption of  developing countries from any obligation 
concerning the reduction of  emissions. This situation is 
particularly problematic in the case of  China, especially 
as it is now the second-largest country in the world by 
its nominal gross domestic product (GDP), possessing 
a very high growth rate (almost 7% in 2017) and it is the 
most important generator of  CO2. However, China is 
not subject to any obligation under the Protocol, it has 
benefited greatly from the clean development mecha-
nism by receiving nearly 60% of  flows22 and was the 
scene of  numerous cases of  fraud23. It should be noted 
however that the situation has changed recently. Sin-
ce 2017, the country has developed the largest carbon 
market covering more than three billion tons of  GHG 
emissions24.
The second cause, the lack of  a long-term vision, 
pushed the actors into permanent negotiations—often-
times hurried—which undermined the process because 
the negotiators lost sight of  the most important and vi-
tal matter (global warming) and instead argued over the 
ancillary (such as financial transfers) during their nume-
rous marathon meetings (COPs). It also pushed away 
the civil society that was not involved in these labyrinths 
of  negotiations and texts with an unclear status (only at 
the UN level there were, in early 2015, more than 7,700 
documents, a figure that has only grown after the Paris 
Agreement). This feeling is reflected in the United Na-
tions’ major global consultation, called My World, which 
aims to identify priorities for a better world. About 10 
million people have completed the survey and it is stri-
king to see that the fight against global warming is only 
16th on the list of  priorities25.
Since the Protocol consists of  time-bound commit-
ments, it was necessary to renew and amplify the ones 
made in Kyoto. Let us briefly revisit the achievements 
21 Ibid., p. 79.
22 Ibid., p.78.
23 See, inter alia, http://www.blogueaqlpa.com/2015/12/10/
mecanisme-de-developpement-propre-mdp-en-quete-dun-nou-
veau-modele/ 
24 http://www.fondation-tuck.fr/upload/docs/application/
pdf/2017-09/vf_panoramamondialoutilseconomiques_bat.pdf
25 http://data.myworld2015.org
and failures of  the COPs that followed the ratification 
of  the Kyoto Protocol.
The COP 15 in Copenhagen (2009), which was in-
tended to find a solution for the post-Kyoto period, was 
negotiated under a cloud of  confusion and led to the 
establishment of  a system of  “à la carte” commitments. 
The only positive outcome was that rich countries 
agreed to annually (from 2020 to 2100) devote US$100 
billion to developing countries. At COP 16 in Cancun26 
in 2010, an agreement was adopted but its only purpose 
was to give the Kyoto Protocol an extension27 as soon 
as possible, without setting deadlines or deciding on its 
binding nature. The COP 17 in Durban the following 
year only allowed for an agreement on the commitment 
periods (2013-2020), while leaving the details to be de-
termined, including the Parties’ reduction objectives28. 
The Doha Conference in December 2012 (COP 18) 
decided on an extension of  the Kyoto Protocol until 
2020. However, three G8 countries (Japan, Russia, and 
Canada) refused to continue their reduction efforts wi-
thin a framework that did not apply to China and the 
United States29. The COP 19 in Warsaw and COP 20 in 
Lima mainly prepared the ground for COP 21 in Paris 
(see below).
3 Reactions to the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol’s GHG reduction targets were 
ambitious; therefore, it was necessary to rely on other 
actors than States to even have a chance of  achieving 
them. At the regional level, the European Union took 
the lead in establishing an emissions trading scheme 
through which European companies could exchange 
emission allowances (1). At the local level, numerous 
initiatives put forward by federated entities and cities 
have attempted to counterbalance the inaction of  cer-
26 BUCHNER (B.), Le retour des négociations à Cancún, Tendances 
Carbone, January 2011, n° 54.
27 United Nations, Report on the sixth session of  the Conference 
of  the Parties serving as the meeting of  the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol, held in Cancún from November 29 to December 10, 
2010, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1, Cancún, 2010.
28 United Nations, Report of  the Conference of  the Parties serv-
ing as the meeting of  the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its sev-
enth session, held in Durban from November 28 to December 11, 
2011; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1, Durban, 2011.
29 DE PERTHUIS (C.) and TROTIGNON (R.), op. cit., p. 79.
PI
G
E
O
LE
T,
 L
ou
ise
; W
A
E
Y
E
N
BE
RG
E
, A
rn
au
d 
Va
n.
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t a
nd
 c
ha
lle
ng
es
 o
f 
ca
rb
on
 m
ar
ke
ts.
 R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
16
, n
. 2
, p
. 7
3-
88
, 2
01
9
79
tain States (2). All this eventually influenced the States 
in the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement, 
the successor to the Kyoto Protocol (3).
3.1  The European Union, its directives and its 
trading scheme
Although initially opposed to the pollution rights 
market system, the European Union, eager to reach an 
agreement by any means necessary but divided and una-
ble to propose a serious political alternative to the Ame-
rican position, resigned itself  and adopted the approach 
by fixing quantities (cap-and-trade) to the detriment of  
the tax in order to put a price on carbon emissions30. 
The initial American proposal became that of  the Eu-
ropeans, whereas it was abandoned on the other side of  
the Atlantic. Therefore, the European Commission had 
to devise and put in place the “Kyoto without the Uni-
ted States” plan31 in order to meet international com-
mitments to reduce GHG emissions.
As part of  its international obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol32, the European Community (at that 
time) adopted a directive33 in 2003 to set up an emissions 
trading scheme (“EU-ETS”). A new directive was pas-
sed in 200934 with the aim of  improving and extending 
it. Recently, another directive –  Directive 2018/41035 
30 CRIQUI (P.), FARACO (B.) and GRANDJEAN (A.), Les Etats 
Carbone, Paris, PUF, 2009, pp. 182 and 183.
31 BIAVA (A.), L’Union européenne face aux défis de l’énergie et du change-
ment climatique : bilan du Conseil européen des 8-9 mars 2007. Revue du 
Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, May 2007, n° 508, p. 
286 to 293 ; CRIQUI (P.), Au cœur du futur régime climatique interna-
tional: taxes ou quotas C02, Working paper, n°4/2009, p. 3, available on 
the website of  the laboratory for the economics of  production and 
international integration lepii.upmf-grenoble.fr/IMG/pdf/NT4_
PC_au-coeur_2009.pdf  ; KURKOWSKI (S.), Distributing the right to 
pollute in the European Union: efficiency, equity, and the environment, New 
York University Environmental Law Journal, 2006, from p. 701.
32 Council Decision 2002/358/EC, April 25, 2002, on the approv-
al, on behalf  of  the European Community, of  the Kyoto Protocol 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the Joint Implementation of  the ensuing commitments (OJ L 
130, p. 1).
33 Directive 2003/87/EC of  the European Parliament and the 
Council, October 13, 2003, establishing a scheme for greenhouse 
gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amend-
ing the 96/61/EC Council Directive (OJ L 275, p. 32), respectively.
34 Directive 2009/29/EC of  the European Parliament and the 
Council, April 23, 2009, amending Directive 2003/87/EC to im-
prove and extend the Community system for the trading of  green-
house gas emission allowances (OJ L 140, p. 63).
35 Directive (EU) 2018/410 of  the European Parliament and the 
Council, March 14, 2018 amending Directive 2003/87/EC in order 
–  was adopted after lengthy negotiations with the Cou-
ncil and the European Parliament and came to modi-
fy the “original” 2003 directive. The adoption of  this 
European system in March of  last year is a testament 
to the Commission’s ever-growing ambition, while also 
reminding States that they should keep increasing their 
efforts in order to reach their international goals regar-
ding climate change.
Overall, the Union’s system is based on two speci-
fic features. Firstly, since the Kyoto Protocol comprises 
objectives that vary depending on the socio-economic 
situation of  each of  the Member States36, during the 
Marrakech Accords (COP 7 in 2001) the Union suc-
ceeded in obtaining the establishment of  a “European 
bubble” that fits directly into the internal market-orien-
ted approach. Indeed, with this “bubble”, the Union’s 
Member States pool their own obligations and set the-
mselves a common objective (-8% compared to 1990)37. 
Secondly, the EU-ETS introduced by the Directive 
mainly creates a market for emission allowances between 
economic operators and no longer between States38. So, we 
move from a public international law approach to a 
market-oriented one. It is no longer a case of  confining 
the matter to interstate relations but of  transposing, as 
if  by translation, the States’ international obligations 
directly to the issuing companies. More particularly, 
European legislation limits the emissions of  more than 
11.000 energy-intensive plants (power plants and the 
most polluting industries such as oil refineries or steel 
but also some aircraft operators) thus covering about 
40% of  GHG emissions39.
Driven by a desire to make its market as fungible 
as possible, the Union adopted the Linking Directive 
to enhance the cost-effectiveness of  emission reductions and to en-
courage low-carbon investments and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 (OJ 
L 76, p. 3).
36 This way, Germany must reduce its emissions by 21% while 
Spain is allowed to increase them by 15%.
37 See PALLEMAERTS (M.), La Communauté européenne comme partie 
contractante au Protocole de Kyoto, Am-Env., 2003, special number, from 
p. 16.
38 The Directive also provides for the possibility for ‘private per-
sons’ to participate in the European carbon market by opening an 
account in the registers in order to buy, sell, or cancel the allowances 
acquired.
39 The inclusion of  certain sectors of  activity in the European car-
bon market and the exclusion of  others has been the subject of  
political choices that were unsuccessfully challenged before the Eu-
ropean Court of  Justice: C-127/07, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorrain 
e.a., ECLI:C:2008:728.
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(2004)40 in order to join the mechanisms of  the Kyoto 
Protocol with the Community scheme. In addition, sin-
ce 2009, the scheme has been ultimately and primarily 
a system of  auctioning allowances41 by the public au-
thority42, a change from the initial free allocation. The 
revenues resulting from auctions must, in part, go to-
wards meeting the objectives of  the fight against global 
warming43.
The 2018 directive finally set a target to reduce GHG 
emissions by at least 40% by 2030 compared to 1990 
levels and enhanced the Union’s ambitions for renewa-
ble energy sources and energy efficiency. This scheme 
also reinforced the market stability reserve created by 
the Council and the European Parliament in 2015 by 
inputting around 265 million allowances for the January 
to August 2019 period, which corresponds to a reduc-
tion of  approximately 40% in the supply of  allowances 
compared to the same period in 201844, thereby increa-
sing the price.
These measures clearly signal the ambition and po-
litical will of  the Commission in terms of  global lea-
dership45 and the conquest of  larger markets46. Never-
theless, their concrete implementation still suffers from 
40 Directive 2004/101/EC of  the European Parliament and the 
Council, October 27, 2004, amending Directive 2003/87/EC under 
the Kyoto Protocol project mechanisms (OJ L 338, p. 18).
41 For an analysis of  the auction process in the European context, 
see CRIQUI (P.), FARACO (B.) and GRANDJEAN (A.), Les États 
Carbone, Paris, PUF, 2009op. cit., p. 195 et 196 ; DE SADELEER 
(N.), Environnement et marché intérieur, Commentary by J. Mégret, Les 
Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2010, from p. 307. See also 
the numerous preparatory documents for the establishment of  this 
auction system on the website http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
ets/auctioning/third/documentation_en.htm. Free allowances will 
however exist for sectors where there are risks of  carbon leakage 
- 2014/746/EU: Commission Decision of  October 27, 2014 estab-
lishing, in accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC of  the European 
Parliament and the Council, the list of  sectors and sub-sectors con-
sidered to be at significant risk of  carbon leakage for the period 
2015-2019, the validity of  which has been extended until 2020 by 
the 2018 Directive. The current list can be consulted at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32014D0746 
42 This auctioning decision therefore leads to the disappearance 
of  the NAPs, which will be replaced by a single Union-wide cap, 
which will be revised downwards according to a linear trend that will 
continue beyond the end of  the third exchange period (2013-2020). 
43 Such as the creation of  a Global Fund for the promotion of  
efficiency and renewable energies or the development of  energy 
efficiency and insulation (article 10, paragraph 3 of  the Directive 
2009/29).
44 Report on the functionning of  the European carbon market, COM(2018), 
842 final, p. 5
45 Recital 24.
46 Recitals 41 and 42.
some imperfections. The European system has mainly 
been disseminated on the basis of  the emission allowan-
ces exchange model, but neither the Kyoto protocol nor 
the European directives set a specific legal framework 
for the emissions trading scheme (for example, sales by 
mutual agreement, through a broker, a bank, the crea-
tion of  a financial center, etc.). This lack of  direction 
has allowed market actors to control this policy through 
exchanges and the complexity of  the mechanisms laid 
down in the directives has led buyers of  carbon assets 
to turn to these exchanges in order to make the pur-
chases and sales of  allowances47. This demonstrates a 
real financialization of  the fight against global warming 
system. Within these exchanges, the price of  the carbon 
allowance has fallen from €26 to less than €5 during the 
first phases of  implementation of  the EU-ETS.
Faced with this fall in prices and the negative con-
sequences it has on the fight against global warming 
(facilitating the purchase of  allowances and lack of  eco-
nomic incentives to resell them), the European institu-
tions took action. They decided to reform the EU ETS 
and to create and strengthen the market stability reserve 
where unallocated or surplus allowances can be frozen. 
These measures seem to have succeeded—for now—
in countering the weakness identified above. Since the 
adoption of  the 2018 directive, carbon prices have in-
deed increased steeply, reaching around €20 in March 
201948. Despite this, the carbon price has still not yet 
reached a high-enough level that would help effectively 
reduce the GHG emission rate. In fact, the High-Level 
Commission on Carbon Prices estimates that only a pri-
ce between US$40 and US$80 per ton of  CO2 emitted 
would be likely—if  reached in 2020—to have the requi-
red impact on the different economic actors to maintain 
the rise of  temperatures below 2°C compared to pre-
-industrial levels49.
47 HAUSER (J.) and MIGEOT (C.), op. cit., November 2006, p. 26.
48 https://www.theice.com/products/197/EUA-Futures/
data?marketId=5115274&span=3 (consulted on March 16, 2019)
49 Report of  the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, May 
2017, p. 50.
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3.2 Local initiatives
Faced with the inaction of  certain States’ govern-
ments, multiple “bottom-up” initiatives have emerged 
throughout the years. In its 2018 report, the World 
Bank lists 25 trading schemes implemented or planned 
at the sub-state level50.
Among the several initiatives, there is significant ac-
tivity from federated entities consisting of  federal Sta-
tes. Certain American, Canadian or Australian federated 
entities have decided to carry out their own actions to 
help the fight against global warming, given the apathy 
of  their respective constituent states51. For the United 
States alone, a total of  28 states have developed climate 
plans and set targets for reducing their carbon emissions.
It is in this context that the pioneering Regional Gree-
nhouse Gas Initiative52 (“RGGI”) was born in the 2000s. 
This mandatory program for power plants in nine states 
in the Northeast of  the United States created an emis-
sions market with the aim to reduce CO2 emissions. 
Since 2008, allowances have been auctioned off  and 
50 State and Trends of  Carbon Pricing 2018, a report of  the World 
Bank, Washington DC, May 2018, p. 39.
51 NB: Canada and Australia have recently become more active 
and are showing political will towards carbon pricing.
52 http://www.rggi.org 
profits have been reinvested in energy efficiency pro-
jects and the development of  renewable energies. A re-
form of  the system53 and a timetable for reducing quan-
tities by 2.5% per year until 2020 have been undertaken 
to revitalize this project54. In 2017, a new reform raised 
the RGGI’s level of  ambition in two respects. On the 
one hand, it planned for a linear annual decrease in ca-
pped quantities55. On the other hand, it established an 
“Emissions Containment Reserve” that should start opera-
ting from 2021, which is reminiscent of  the European 
market stability reserve. However, the US mechanism is 
based on a trigger price system and therefore demands 
for allowances to be withdrawn from circulation in the 
event of  the carbon price falling below US$6 by 2021 
(amount that will gradually increase after that)56. New 
Jersey decided to join the initiative in 2018 and Virginia 
seems to be in the process of  doing so, while Massa-
chusetts, already a member of  this program, has con-
currently developed and implemented its own system 
of  allowances exchange57.
Resting upon regional carbon market initiatives, a 
transnational allowance system in this case, the Western 
Climate Initiative intended to bring together California, 
British Columbia, and Quebec, as well as a few other 
American states and Canadian provinces as observers. 
This market is aimed primarily at companies in the in-
dustrial and electricity sectors, as well as those operating 
in the fuel and fossil fuels sector. After experiencing 
some difficulties58, the cap-and-trade system was esta-
blished and the auctioning finally started in 2013, but 
only for Quebec59 and California60, with British Colum-
53 For a presentation of  the reforms, see https://www.rggi.org/
docs/PressReleases/PR130207_ModelRule.pdf; for an overview of  
the RGGI policy since 2017, see https://www.rggi.org/sites/de-
fault/files/Uploads/Design-Archive/Model-Rule/2017-Program-
Review-Update/2017_Model_Rule_revised.pdf
54 AYKUT (S.) and DAHAN (A.), Gouverner le climat ? 20 ans de 
négociations internationales, Paris, Presses de SciencesPo, 2014, p. 203 
and 204.
55 http://www.c2es.org/content/regional-greenhouse-gas-initia-
tive-rggi/ (consulted on March 16, 2019)
56 https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/elements 
(consulted on March 16, 2019)
57 State and Trends of  Carbon Pricing 2018, a report of  the World 
Bank, Washington DC, May 2018, p. 51.
58 AYKUT (S.) and DAHAN (A.), op. cit., p. 204.
59 For a description of  the evolution of  the situation viewed 
through the lens of  the Quebec authorities, see http://www.md-
delcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/WCI.htm 
60 The most successful domestic initiative was setup in Califor-
nia in 2006 through the Global Warming Solutions Act. This carbon 
market, launched in 2013, aims to meet the objective of  the Kyoto 
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bia preferring to play the carbon tax card to reduce its 
emissions. Finally, in May 2018, Nova Scotia joined Ca-
lifornia, Quebec, and Ontario in this initiative61, albeit 
the latter decided to withdraw in July62, after elections. 
This event still demonstrates the weakness of  regional 
trading systems: their dependence on entities that agree 
to link their markets (and thus on the political figures 
that govern them) increases the risk of  price volatility 
in the common market. A quick comparison raises the 
question of  the impact of  the United Kingdom’s exit 
from the Union on the EU-ETS and on the price of  the 
emission allowance.
At the local level, let us highlight the Mayors in action63 
program, which brings together thousands of  munici-
palities representing hundreds of  millions of  people. In 
May 2014, these cities signed an agreement (Covenant of  
Mayors)64 through which they commit themselves to de-
veloping and promoting renewable energy at their level 
of  power. By February 2017, no less than 7200 munici-
palities representing more than 228 million inhabitants 
had signed this agreement. This program is not solely 
focused on this political ambition. It also offers a pla-
tform for best practices sharing, as well as technical and 
scientific assistance for the municipalities that request it.
Far from drawing up an exhaustive list, this section 
aims to demonstrate the extent of  the actions under-
taken by sub-state actors. It is proof  of  the scope of  
their influence.
Protocol, i.e. to reduce the emission levels to those of  1990 for 
2020. For California, it would be a reduction of  15% from the 2006 
levels. For a study of  California’s policies, see, MALACZINSKI (J.) 
and DUANE (T.), Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Vehicle Miles 
Traveled: Integrating the California Environmental Quality Act with Califor-
nia Global Warming Solutions Act, 36 Ecology L.Q., 2009, p. 71 to 135 
and AYKUT (S.) and DAHAN (A.), op. cit., p. 205.
61 https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/news-archive/552-nova-
scotia-joins-the-western-climate-initiative-inc 
62 https://californiacarbon.info/tag/western-climate-initiative-
wci/ . For other situations in which policy changes have impacted 
the trading scheme, see State and Trends of  Carbon Pricing 2018, a re-
port of  the World Bank, Washington DC, May 2018, pp. 25 and 26.
63 http://www.mayorsinaction.eu/home/ - a relatively similar ac-
tion of  more than 200 mayors was born in the USA and was in line 
with the objectives of  the Kyoto protocol.
64 For an analysis of  this commitment, see RANGONE (N.), The 
Nature and Role of  SEAPS for Environmental Regulation in the Multilevel 
Planning System, N. Rangone and J. Ziller (dir.), Policies and Regulations 
for Local Sustainable Development. The Covenant of  Mayors, Editoriale Sci-
entifica, 2013, pp. 65-82.
3.3 The 2016 Paris Agreement
Given the world’s major polluting powers’ lack of  
enthusiasm and the European Union’s inability to play 
a leadership role in international negotiations, the COP 
21 in Paris was intended to be their last chance to reach 
an agreement on the issue. The text of  the agreement 
thus reached65 is, in our opinion, not as ambitious as 
what the organizers declared triumphantly. Let us re-
turn to its most prominent features.
The objective of  this agreement, which will lead the 
fight against global warming for the post-2020 period, 
is now to limit the increase in the global average tem-
perature to “well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and 
“to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C”, 
which would “significantly reduce the risks and impacts of  cli-
mate change”. 
The agreement calls for the establishment of  na-
tional commitments to combat global warming (“na-
tionally determined contributions”, Article 4). These 
commitments will be reviewed every five years, so for 
the first time in 2025. Their verification and sanction 
of  non-compliance is based primarily on a transparency 
and reputation mechanism66. In concrete terms, a com-
mittee of  experts will have to check the information 
provided by the countries in terms of  monitoring their 
emissions and publish the results. Peer and civil society 
pressure should encourage states to keep their promi-
ses67. The Paris Agreement therefore lacks any other 
mechanism of  control and sanction than that of  “na-
ming and shaming”.
With regard to carbon markets, Article 6 provides a 
basis for international cooperation to achieve the objec-
tive set by the Parties. This cooperation can take various 
forms, including that of  a carbon market. Indeed, Article 
6 can be divided into four parts, the last three corres-
ponding to as many possible methods of  cooperation. 
The importance of  this “new climate architecture”68 
65 For an excellent analysis of  the stakes of  COP 21, see DE 
PERTHUIS (C.) and TROTIGNON (R.), op. cit., p. 65 to 120.
66 On this matter, see BARNETT (M.) and DUVALL (R.) (dir.), 
Power in Global Governance, Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005.
67 Find out more on http://www.lemonde.fr/cop21/arti-
cle/2015/12/14/cop21-un-compromis-guide-par-la-justice-clima-
tique_4831575_4527432.html#RpipVvSHhXDXrFiq.99 
68 Decoding article 6 of  the Paris Agreement, document of  the Asian 
Development Bank, April 2018, https://www.adb.org/sites/de-
fault/files/publication/418831/article6-paris-agreement.pdf  , p. vii.
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makes it necessary to dwell on Article 6 and the me-
chanisms it identifies and establishes in order to better 
understand the impact of  the Paris Agreement on car-
bon markets.
The first paragraph sets out the scope of  Article 6 as 
a whole. It states that: “Parties recognize that some Parties 
choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of  
their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher am-
bition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote 
sustainable development and environmental integrity”69. There 
are two points that we should look at here. First, the 
bottom-up approach characteristic of  the Paris Agree-
ment is clearly asserted in this paragraph: international 
cooperation is recognized (and not approved) and it 
operates on a voluntary (and non-binding) basis. Then, 
the procedures and mechanisms to which the article 
is referring target both the already existing cases of  
cooperation (such as the EU-ETS) and those that may 
emerge in the future. Article 6 of  the Paris Agreement 
therefore does not focus exclusively on market mecha-
nisms and provides a broader basis for action by States 
parties wishing to revise their rising climate ambitions.
The second and third paragraphs deal with Internatio-
nally Transferrable Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs). 
They state: “Parties shall, where engaging on a voluntary basis 
in cooperative approaches that involve the use of  internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes towards nationally determined 
contributions, promote sustainable development and ensure en-
vironmental integrity and transparency, including in governance, 
and shall apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoi-
dance of  double counting, consistent with guidance adopted by the 
Conference of  the Parties serving as the meeting of  the Parties 
to this Agreement […] The use of  internationally transferred 
mitigation outcomes to achieve nationally determined contributions 
under this Agreement shall be voluntary and authorized by par-
ticipating Parties”70.
Once again, the Parties emphasized the purely vo-
luntary nature of  the potential cooperation between 
them. In addition, several clarifications are necessary, 
but we will pay particular attention to the following 
three. First, these provisions do not create a carbon ma-
rket or carbon pricing as such, but provide the opportu-
nity for Parties to create such an international market if  
they so wish71. It should thus be noted that States are re-
69 Paris Agreement, art. 6, §1.
70 Paris Agreement, art. 6 §§2 and 3.
71 MARCU (A.), Carbon Market provisions in the Paris Agreement (Ar-
quired to promote sustainable development, guarantee 
environmental integrity and transparency in accordance 
with the CMA transparency guidelines and establish an 
accounting system to avoid double counting. In this res-
pect, following the adoption of  the agreement, Andrei 
Marcu already judiciously raised the question of  “whether 
the CMA, or a designated body, is foreseen as playing an active 
(regulatory?) role in [...] the transfer of  mitigation outcomes”72. 
Finally, it is important to highlight the lack of  any indi-
cation as to how cooperation at the regional or sub-na-
tional levels should be integrated, even though this type 
of  cooperation was explicitly featured in the Preamble 
of  the Paris Agreement73. Once again according to An-
drei Marcu, who participated in the negotiations of  Ar-
ticle 6 of  the agreement, there is no reason to conclude 
that the latter does not allow such cooperation “as long 
as they are coordinated/synchronized with the respective Party 
in accounting towards its NDC”. In concrete terms, these 
paragraphs provide a framework for the accounting of  
transfers of  mitigation results between Parties that are 
free to make such transfers if  and as they wish to. Only 
in this context would they help with the establishment 
of  a carbon market.
Paragraph 4 of  Article 6 creates a “new flexibility 
mechanism”74 often referred to as the successor of  the 
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism: the 
Mechanism for Sustainable Development which aims 
to “contribute to the mitigation of  greenhouse gas emissions and 
support sustainable development”75. Several more specific as-
pects are expanded on in paragraphs 5 and 6.
The seventh paragraph states that “the Conference of  the 
Parties serving as the meeting of  the Parties to this Agreement 
shall adopt rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism 
referred to in paragraph 4 of  this Article at its first session” 
(i.e. at COP 22). According to the Institute for Climate 
Economics, this mechanism “could allow for the emer-
gence of  a compensation mechanism that offers Par-
ties the flexibility to use emission reductions achieved 
ticle 6), research paper for the International Center for Climate Gov-
ernance, February 2016, p. 6.
72 Ibid., p. 8.
73 Paris Agreement, recital 15: “Recognizing the importance of  the en-
gagements of  all levels of  government
and various actors, in accordance with respective national legislations of  Parties, 
in addressing climate change”.
74 BULTHEEL (C.), MOREL (R.) and ALBEROLA (E.), Gouvern-
ance du climat & Accord de Paris : le pari audacieux de la coopération trans-
nationale, climate point n° 40 of  the Institute for Climate Economics 
(I4CE), November 2016, p. 5.
75 Paris Agreement, art. 6, §4.
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outside their jurisdiction, which could lead to the ex-
tension of  this carbon price signal to other sectors and 
countries”76.
 Finally, the last two paragraphs of  Article 6 provide a 
framework for Parties wishing to cooperate on the basis 
of  non-market approaches, in contrast to the 1997 Pro-
tocol which relied exclusively on market mechanisms to 
meet the needs for cooperation77.
In conclusion, even though it does not in itself  
establish a carbon market, the Paris Agreement, and 
more specifically Article 6 (detailed above), is likely to 
play a facilitating and catalytic role in “the emergence 
of  transnational approaches that directly or indirectly 
put a price on carbon”78. In this respect, it follows the 
market-oriented approach that was legally recognized 
in 1997, while making certain changes that we should 
briefly highlight.
What most distinguishes the Kyoto Protocol from 
the Paris Agreement79 also partially explains why the lat-
ter could be adopted at COP 21 and entered into force 
just as quickly80. It is the fact that the agreement was 
elaborated using a bottom-up and more decentralized 
approach, while the Protocol operated on the basis of  
a top-down system and in a more centralized manner81. 
Therefore, the main issue at COP 21 was to find a way 
to ensure the long-term pursuit of  GHG emission re-
duction targets. As a result, the Paris Agreement marks 
a major change from previous texts adopted by the Par-
ties. It focuses more on developing methods and tools 
that can be mobilized to act in the long term. In other 
words, the Paris Agreement provides a structure in and 
76 DAHAN (L.), VAIDYULA  (M.), AFRIAT (M.) and ALBERO-
LA (E.), « L’Accord de Paris : un nouveau cadre international visant 
à faciliter l’adoption de politiques de tarification du carbone », cli-
mate point n°39 of  the Institute for Climate Economics (I4CE), 
April 2016, p. 6.
77 BULTHEEL (C.), MOREL (R.) and ALBEROLA (E.), op. cit., 
p. 7
78 DAHAN (L.), VAIDYULA  (M.), AFRIAT (M.) and ALBER-
OLA (E.), op. cit., p. 5.
79 In this regard, see Decoding article 6 of  the Paris Agreement, docu-
ment of  the Asian Development Bank, April 2018, https://www.
adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/418831/article6-paris-
agreement.pdf  , pp. 5 and 6.
80 It entered into force in November 2016 when the required dou-
ble majority was reached (ratification, acceptance, approval or com-
pliance by at least 55 countries representing at least 55% of  global 
emissions).
81 Decoding article 6 of  the Paris Agreement, document of  the Asian 
Development Bank, April 2018, https://www.adb.org/sites/de-
fault/files/publication/418831/article6-paris-agreement.pdf  , p. 6
through which stakeholders can develop their climate 
policy and action in order to achieve the common goal 
of  limiting the increase of  temperatures. This overlaps 
with the flexibility of  the agreement. It should be noted, 
however, that although it does not explicitly mention 
sanctions, this instrument remains a treaty of  interna-
tional law (more specifically an additional protocol to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change) to be executed in good faith by the Parties82.
In addition to this, while the Protocol provides that 
only industrialized countries are required to pursue a 
quantified GHG emission target, the Agreement requi-
res all Contracting Parties to determine at the national 
level their contribution to the common goal of  redu-
cing GHG emissions. In the same vein, the two instru-
ments display a desire for flexibility in the mechanisms 
put in place to enable the Parties to fulfill their obliga-
tions to the best of  their ability, but it appears that the 
latter responds to this requirement more by offering the 
possibility to cooperate to all States Parties, regardless 
of  their degree of  development.
One thing is certain, as noted by the Institute for 
Climate Economics: “On the whole, this new approach moves 
away from the binding framework advocated by the Kyoto Protocol 
and has the advantage of  having promoted a number of  com-
mitments without precedent by state and non-state actors”83. Let 
us not forget, however, that this cooperative approach 
alone is not sufficient to achieve the objective of  limi-
ting the temperature increase to the 2°C set in the Paris 
Agreement. It will be necessary to pay a great deal of  
attention to the concrete actions undertaken by the di-
fferent actors involved in order to evaluate the effecti-
veness of  the process—more acknowledged rather than 
actually implemented—of  Article 6.
Before concluding this section, we should take note 
of  the outcome of  the last COP in Poland that took 
place at the end of  2018: the technical complexity and 
lack of  political consensus on the issue of  carbon ma-
rkets and, more specifically, regarding the transferable 
emissions accounting system created to ensure the avoi-
dance of  double counting, led States to defer this deli-
cate matter until the next COP84.
82 Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties (1969), art. 26.
83 BULTHEEL (C.), MOREL (R.) and ALBEROLA (E.), op. cit., 
p. 1.
84 https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop24-key-outcomes-agreed-at-
the-un-climate-talks-in-katowice
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In conclusion, on a global scale, the Protocol never 
truly worked because very few States were ready to truly 
play the game. The industrialized countries did not want 
to risk weakening their national economies and the less 
industrialized ones did not have sufficient incentives to 
pursue a less carbon-intensive development. The repea-
ted major international negotiations made it possible to 
achieve a handful of  limited agreements but above all 
demonstrated the inability of  States to commit to quan-
tified objectives whose violation would be accompanied 
by real punitive measures. By sanctioning the bottom-
-up regulatory process, the Paris Agreement marks a 
further step in the direction of  the legally non-binding. 
Not all is doom and gloom, however, as evidenced by 
the evolution of  the world situation in recent years. It 
is very obvious that it is increasingly difficult for leaders 
to explain to the civil society their opposition to a se-
rious plan to fight global warming. The Kyoto Protocol, 
although it has not kept its promises, has the merit of  
existing, of  setting in motion a dynamic and making it 
possible to set a price for carbon. As evidence, the Paris 
Agreement, its successor for the post-2020 period, at-
tests to the relevance and preservation of  this dynamic 
as it explicitly recognizes the existence and possibility 
of  developing “cooperative approaches” that involve 
the use of  transferred “mitigation outcomes”.
4  Active cooperation for better 
fungibility by means of new 
technologies
The Kyoto Protocol and its direct result, the car-
bon markets, have not kept their promises. Currently 
the vast majority of  carbon at the global level is not 
tariffed (only 20% of  global GHGs priced in 2018)85 
or is underpriced. The fight against global warming 
concerns everyone and therefore requires a joint effort. 
We believe that the only truly possible solution lies in 
the close collaboration between actors from different 
levels of  government, the civil society, and the business 
community. Without this cooperation, the fight against 
rising temperatures is doomed to fail or make very little 
progress. Social actors exist and the challenge is now to 
channel them to act as a real force for change. The aim 
85 State and Trends of  Carbon Pricing 2018, a report of  the World 
Bank, Washington DC, May 2018, p. 17.
of  this last part is not to re-examine the fight against 
global warming using an idealistic and utopian approa-
ch, but to identify the beginnings of  existing and promi-
sing solutions in order to correct current international 
and European systems by making them more efficient.
Better market fungibility is a necessary and indis-
pensable step towards the improvement of  the existing 
system. In other words, it is imperative to improve the 
interchangeability between this ensemble of  carbon 
markets by ensuring the full preservation and insepara-
bility of  the benefits and obligations of  emission rights 
as such or certificates covering them. This is a princi-
ple that ultimately posits the total legal equivalence of  
emission rights within a range of  GHG emission tra-
ding systems86. This idea is gaining further and further 
ground87. It is based on the axiom of  economic theory 
where the larger the market the more attractive it is. Fi-
nally, the various carbon markets should form a single 
global carbon market. For companies, linking would 
allow them to use allowances from other systems in or-
der to achieve compliance. Once linked, prices in these 
different systems will converge until they are identical.
This increased fungibility will only be possible if  
an actor has the political will to coordinate the proli-
feration of  existing initiatives by linking the markets. It 
takes a great deal of  time to negotiate agreements be-
tween systems, as well as money to create the necessary 
market infrastructures, alongside a solid dose of  diplo-
macy to convince the various stakeholders. The UN is 
the most natural actor, although the different COPs sin-
ce the Kyoto Protocol, the lack of  enthusiasm for the 
carbon markets issue in the Paris Agreement, and what 
could be described as procrastination of  the States Par-
ties in this regard at the last COPs, have raised concerns 
regarding the lack of  efficiency and effectiveness of  the 
current inter-state system. If  the UN is not up to the 
task, then hopefully the European Union, which cer-
tainly has the means as well as the ambition, is able to 
impose itself  on the international scene to play this role.
Whatever the resource actor, this coordination 
would in any case take the form of  a progressive linka-
86 LEBLANC (B.), Le Protocole de Kyoto et le marché du carbone : vers une 
fongibilité asymétrique à l’échelle internationale, 2005, Master’s thesis avail-
able at www.archipel.uqam.ca/1982/1/M9160.pdf
87 A discussion forum promoting the search for means to link 
the different markets has recently been created. It brings together a 
group of  national and international civil servants, as well as univer-
sity professors – www.icapcarbonaction.com 
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ge between the carbon markets which could happen 
via the use of  new technologies such as distributed led-
gers (“distributed registers”), of  which the most known 
type is that of  the blockchain, used in particular for the 
creation of  the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. The blockchain 
is indeed an interesting tool whose mobilization seems 
necessary for the implementation of  the political and 
legal framework of  the fight against global warming.
The blockchain can be defined as “an information 
storage and transmission technology that is transparent, 
secure, and operates without a central control body. 
[This chain of  blocks] constitutes a database that con-
tains the history of  all the exchanges made between 
its users since its creation. This database is secure and 
distributed: it is shared by its users, without interme-
diaries, which allows everyone to verify the validity of  
the chain”88. Its distributed nature sets it apart from the 
“traditional” Internet that has developed around pla-
tforms and third-party control. Instead of  having to go 
through an intermediary, contributors involved in crea-
ting a shared registry between different computers inte-
ract directly via the blockchain. The verification of  the 
transferred content no longer takes place via a central 
actor but through a peer-to-peer network.
It should be noted that this characteristic of  the blo-
ckchain is also what makes it a tool of  choice for the 
implementation of  the Paris Agreement. The Louis Ba-
chelier Institute (“LBI”) in France thus promotes the 
use of  blockchain and distributed ledger technology 
(DLT) to facilitate the implementation of  the reporting 
framework provided by the Paris Agreement (based on 
the use of  monitoring, reporting and verification tools). 
This project aims to facilitate the development of  a 
strong framework for Nationally Determined Contri-
butions and a two-degree pathway alignment strategy 
for non-state actors. According to The Climate Chain 
website, the use of  this technology “will build capital ma-
rket confidence and help reach the Paris Accord target at both 
local and global levels through consensus methods and technical 
interoperability”89. Although still in the research phase, 
this reflection has the merit of  highlighting the ability 
of  the blockchain to serve as an infrastructure in whi-
ch the various mechanisms involved in the fight against 
climate change, such as but not solely carbon markets, 
88 https://blockchainfrance.net/decouvrir-la-blockchain/c-est-
quoi-la-blockchain/
89 http://www.theclimatechain.org
could develop.
It is also particularly interesting to see that this idea 
has also made its way into the field of  climate gover-
nance, thanks to the leadership of  the UNFCCC Secre-
tariat. The latter has actually encouraged and facilitated 
the creation of  the Climate Chain Coalition, which cur-
rently includes more than one hundred member organi-
zations90. This is an open global initiative that was laun-
ched during the 2017 One Planet Summit and which 
resulted in the adoption of  a Charter comprised of  nine 
principles, including one on technological neutrality and 
one on the harmonization of  the actions of  the coali-
tion with the long-term goals of  the Paris Agreement91.
Finally, we should also mention the practical benefits 
of  the blockchain for effective climate action. Massam-
ba Thioye, who is leading UN Climate Change’s work 
exploring blockchain, believes that this technology and 
DLTs could “strengthen monitoring, reporting and verification 
of  the impacts of  climate action; improve transparency, traceabi-
lity and cost-effectiveness of  climate action; build trust among cli-
mate actors; make incentive mechanisms for climate action accessi-
ble to the poorest [and] support mobilization of  green finance”92.
Specifically, the blockchain could be used to impro-
ve carbon trading; some argue for the free use of  digital 
ledgers as a platform for networking carbon markets so 
as to achieve the objectives of  the Paris Agreement93. 
This type of  usage is not purely hypothetical: IBM and 
the Energy Blockchain Lab are collaborating on the deve-
lopment of  an emission allowances trading platform in 
China. The blockchain also facilitates, as the Belgian ex-
periment has demonstrated94, the peer-to-peer exchan-
ge of  renewable energy within a decentralized system 
whereby the consumer and inefficiency costs are redu-
ced. Particularly relevant when it comes to the carbon 
market, blockchain technology and smart contracts that 
can be concluded by making use of  it make it possible 
to convert the generated low-carbon energy into carbon 
90 https://www.climatechaincoalition.io/membership-list (con-
sulted on 29th of  October 2019)
91 https://unfccc.int/news/un-supports-blockchain-technology-
for-climate-action 
92 Idem..
93 See JACKSON, (A.), LLOYD, (A.), MACINANTE, (J.) and 
HUWENER (M.), Networked Carbon Markets: Permissionless Innova-
tion with Distributed Ledgers?, 2017; online at: https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2997099
94 This is the NRGcoin concept developed by the Free University 
of  Brussels (VUB), as part of  the European Scanenergy project; see 
http://nrgcoin.org/about
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credits and to sell them or, conversely, buy them on the 
market so as to offset a polluting activity. In this way, the 
blockchain would make possible the implementation of  
allowance trading and allow for better fungibility. This 
technology would also promote the development of  
crowdfunding and disintermediated financial transactions 
(peer-to-peer) in support of  climate action. Finally, the 
use of  blockchain is likely to help with the monitoring 
and reporting of  GHG emissions and the avoidance of  
double counting, thereby contributing to the establish-
ment of  a strong transparency mechanism, as envisaged 
in the Paris Agreement95.
5 Final conclusions
A realistic approach is needed: a unique, fast and easy 
solution to counter the effects of  global warming does 
not exist. The problem of  climate change is global, and as 
such its solution must also be developed on a global scale.
In terms of  available solutions, we believe that it 
would be unrealistic to suddenly break with the market-
-oriented approach which the international community 
has employed for the past twenty years. As imperfect as 
it may be, this system has the merit of  already existing 
and is something that has never been done before. This 
sentiment is reinforced by the observation that the ac-
tors aspire to a clear and sustainable system which they 
can trust so that they can invest their energy in these 
carbon markets. In our opinion, the key to the success 
of  this global public policy therefore rests more upon 
the improvement of  the existing system.
We believe that it is necessary for this improvement 
to involve both the coordination and the linking of  va-
rious existing initiatives, of  which we have briefly pre-
sented the most noteworthy. Fungibility would be the 
legal equivalent. However, even if  this solution appears 
to be the most realistic, a political decision is necessary 
to link the markets and an arbitrator must be chosen, 
one who will have to guarantee that the rules of  the 
game are being followed and who will also vouch for 
the integrity of  the allowance: the common currency. 
The European example of  linkage with the flexibility 
mechanisms resulting from the Kyoto Protocol and the 
95 How Blockchain Technology Could Boost Climate Action, June 2017, 
https://unfccc.int/news/how-blockchain-technology-could-boost-
climate-action
countries of  the European Economic Area is in this 
respect enlightening and demonstrates the feasibility 
of  the operation, but also illustrates the numerous di-
fficulties encountered in its concrete implementation. 
Concurrently, the efforts of  the civil society and the rise 
of  new technologies such as the blockchain represent a 
solution, if  not alternative then at least complementary, 
to the traditional interstate approach.
The strengthening of  existing carbon markets, the 
development of  new allowance trading systems and 
the combination of  all these, aided by the use of  new 
technologies and controlled by a globalized civil socie-
ty whose political power can no longer be overlooked, 
constitute, in our view, the way forward in the fight 
against global warming.
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